Imitation, Objects, Tools, and the Rudiments of Language in Human Ontogeny
Human beings are imitative generalists. We can immediately imitate a wide range of behaviors with great facility, whether they be vocal maneuvers, body postures, or actions on objects. The ontogeny of this skill has been an enduring question in developmental psychology. Classical theory holds that the ability to imitate facial gestures is a milestone that is passed at about one year. Before this time infants are thought to lack the perceptualcognitive sophistication necessary to match a gesture they can see with one they cannot see themselves perform. A second developmental milestone is the capacity for deferred imitation, i.e. imitation of an absent model. This is said to emerge at about 18 months, in close synchrony with other higher-order activities such as object permanence and tool use, as part of a general cognitive shift from a purely sensory-motor level of functioning to one that allows language. Research suggests that the imitative capacity of young infants has been underestimated. Human infants are capable of imitating facial gestures at birth, with infants less than one day old manifesting this skill. Moreover recent experiments have established deferred imitation well before the predicted age of 18 months. Studies discussed here show that 9-month-olds can duplicate acts after a delay of 24 hours, and that 14-month-olds can retain and duplicate as many as five actions over a 1-week delay. These new findings re-raise questions about the relation between nonverbal cognitive development and language development: What aspects, if any, of these two domains are linked? A hypothesis is delineated that predicts certain very specific relations between particular cognitive and semantic achievements during the one-word stage, and data are reported supporting this hypothesis. Specifically, relations are reported between: (a) the development of object permanence and the use of words encoding disappearance, (b) means-ends understanding (as manifest in tool use) and words encoding success and failure, and (c) categorization behavior and the onset of the naming explosion. This research on human ontogeny suggests close and highly specific links between aspects of early language and thought.
In addition to language, one of the hallmarks of Homo sapiens is a proclivity for imitation, a trait that enables essentially no-trial learning. Humans depend upon and profit from imitation more than any other species. Many of the skills, behavior patterns, cultural rituals, and traditions exhibited by adults are acquired at least in part through * This research was supported by grants from NIH (HD-22514) and the MacArthur Foundation. I wish to acknowledge the insights and collaboration of A. Gopnik and K. Moore in much of this work; without these colleagues this paper could not have been written. I thank P. Kuhl for comments on an earlier draft, and C. Harris for on-going assistance in the research program. MELTZOFF imitation and not the maturation of genetically specified motor programs, trial and error, or independent invention.
While evolving in accordance with Darwinian principles, early hominids at some point also began to benefit from a more Lamarckian-type process in which information acquired by one generation was directly transmitted to the next. This must have been accomplished through imitative learning by the young and perhaps explicit teaching by the adult (BARNETT, 1973) . Without some such capacity, the knowledge of how to manufacture stone tools or use fire would have been lost after each generation, endlessly dependent upon independent re-discovery. BECK (1974) notes that baboons, but not chimpanzees, are probably isolated from their ancestors in just this way. Wild chimpanzees use tools such as levers, sponges, and probes during food-gathering; conversely the use of simple tools by wild baboons is rare. Why is this so? Beck proposes that the sensory, motor, and cognitive capacities for tool use are not the decisive factors. It also is not that environmental conditions are unfavorable for wild baboons, because both chimpanzees and olive baboons occupy the same space and often compete for the same resources in the Gombe National Park. Although both spend hours catching and eating termites, the chimpanzees greatly facilitate this by inserting sticks into the subterranean nests ( VAN LAWIcK-GooDALL, 1968 , 1970 . The baboons do not and are correspondingly less efficient in obtaining this valuable source of protein.
Beck suggests that one important key to the wild chimpanzees' tool-using superiority is their ability to learn from conspecifics who fortuitously discover tool use and the inability of baboons to profit in this way. Baboons are limited to independent reinventions, whereas chimpanzees can benefit from their cultural heritage. Thus he notes that <~a researcher sampling a slice of time in the history of a wild chimpanzee population is quite likely to see tool behavior frequently, while a study of baboons will yield, at best, a few isolated instances)~ (BzcK, 1974, p. 515) . In conclusion Beck speculates that the advent of tool-using traditions in hominids may have been tied to the evolution of an aptitude for observational learning, for without it the inventive uses made of tools by single individuals would have died with them instead of being transmitted to others in the culture.
Recent evidence has provided interesting constraints on chimpanzees' ability for cultural transmission (KITAHARA-FRIsCH & NORIKOSHI, 1982 ; TOMASELLO, DAVIS-DASILA, CAMAK & BARD, 1987) . In the Tomasello et al. study chimpanzees were given the task of imitating another chimpanzee who had been trained to use a stick to obtain out of reach food. Although the older subjects consistently failed, the younger ones profited from the exposure to the model. Nonetheless the authors note that even this behavior may not have been full scale imitation. The animals may merely have become more interested in using the stick because they saw it picked up and handled by a conspecific, and this might have led them subsequently to the chance discovery that it could be used to retrieve the food. This hypothesis could be tested experimentally by exposing subjects to an animal taught to handle the implement in a non-effective way (which should not lead to systematic tool use in the observes if imitation is operating). This control was not conducted, therefore the authors' conservative conclusion was that true imitation of tool use by chimpanzees was not unequivocally demonstrated either by their experimental work or other more naturalistic observations which, of course, did not use such experimental manipulations. The purpose of this essay is not to re-open the long-standing debate about whether non-human animals are capable of true imitation. (For recent reviews, see GALEV, 1988; ZENTALL, 1988 .) It is sufficient to note that such behavior is often difficult to demonstrate in animals once proper controls are instituted. This does not contradict the idea that
